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ABSTRACT
For decades, U.S. labor and employment law has used a binary em-
ployment classification system, labeling workers as either employees or
independent contractors. Employees are granted a variety of legal pro-
tections, while independent contractors are not. However, the explo-
sion of the gig-economy—which connects consumers with underutilized
resources—has produced a growing number of workers who do not
seem to fit into either category. Though far from traditional employees,
gig-workers bear little resemblance to independent contractors. Forced
to choose, however, most gig-economy companies label their workers
as independent contractors, depriving them of many basic worker-pro-
tections. Gig-workers have turned to the courts, hoping to secure em-
ployee protections, and judges have struggled to apply outdated multi-
factor tests to resolve these disputes. Using Uber drivers as a model for
workers in the gig-economy, this note argues that such workers are
properly classified as employees under the common-law control test,
the prevailing legal standard today. However, because of outdated fac-
tors and widespread confusion regarding the current employment clas-
sification system, reform is necessary. The ABC Test, primarily used in
state unemployment-insurance cases, offers the best alternative. The
ABC Test limits the number of factors for courts to apply, eliminates
the most manipulable and outdated factors, and adds a presumption in
favor of employee status. Reforming the classification system in this
way will ensure that the law treats gig-economy workers, a growing
portion of the modern workforce, as employees with the support of nec-
essary benefits and protections.
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INTRODUCTION
  In 1914, the Lehigh Valley Coal Company (“Lehigh”) argued before Judge
Learned Hand that, despite its name, it was “not in the business of coal
mining at all.”1 Instead, Lehigh claimed simply to own mines and sell the
extracted product—actual mining was contracted out to independent labor-
ers.2 Under this arrangement, Lehigh gave miners access to company mines
and would later purchase the coal these workers acquired.3 Thus, Lehigh
argued, it owed no duty to these workers, who were not employees, and
therefore not protected by the workers’ compensation statute at issue in the
1. Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage, 218 F. 547, 552 (2d Cir. 1914).
2. See Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee When It Sees
One and How It Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 312 (2001).
3. Lehigh Valley Coal, 218 F. at 552.
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case.4 The argument that a mine-owning, coal-selling company is “not in the
business of coal mining at all” seems farfetched—perhaps even ridiculous.
Judge Hand certainly thought so when he ruled for the plaintiff, stating it
would be “absurd to class[ify] such a miner as an independent contractor”5
given that miners alone “carr[y] on the company’s only business.”6
Today, more than a century later, companies continue to make similar
claims. Uber Technologies, Inc. (“Uber”), a company that allows consumers
to hail rides using an online mobile application, provides a recent example.
In response to various suits brought by Uber drivers challenging their inde-
pendent contractor status, the tech start-up has raised uncannily similar argu-
ments to those Lehigh brought before Judge Hand over 100 years ago. For
example, in a case brought before the California Labor Commissioner’s Of-
fice in June 2015, Uber argued it was not a transportation company at all,
but rather “a neutral technological platform designed simply to enable [inde-
pendent] drivers and passengers to transact the business of transportation.”7
Cases like these two, where the court is asked to determine whether
workers are contractors or employees, are no rare breed in American juris-
prudence. For over 100 years, America has classified workers into these two
categories, yet the law continuously fails to do so in a uniform, predictable,
and purposeful way. Despite this legal confusion, the line between an em-
ployee and an independent contractor is crucial, since the distinction often
determines whether labor and employment statutes cover individuals.8 Thus,
scholars, courts, and legislatures alike have strived to clarify and reform the
binary worker classification system, largely to no avail.9
While employment classification is an old legal conundrum, the rise of
the “gig-economy” is now pushing America’s broken system to the forefront
of policymakers’ and courts’ agendas with new force. The gig-economy,
also known as the sharing, on-demand, or platform economy, is comprised
of companies that typically use technology to connect consumers with un-
4. See Carlson, supra note 2, at 312 n.78 (“The exact nature of the statute is unclear.
The claim was for injuries suffered in an accident at the mine, and Judge Hand refers only
once to the underlying statute, without citation.”).
5. Lehigh Valley Coal, 218 F. at 552.
6. Id. at 553.
7. Berwick v. Uber Techs. Inc., Case No. 11-46739 EK, Cal. Labor Comm’n (June 3,
2015).
8. For an extensive list of labor and employment laws that apply to “employees” and
not independent contractors, see Appendix.
9. See Micah Prieb Stoltzfus Jost, Note, Independent Contractors, Employees, and En-
trepreneurialism Under the National Labor Relations Act: A Worker-by-Worker Approach, 68
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 311, 317 (2011) (“It is hardly novel to argue that the current legal
regime for determining coverage under the NLRA, as well as other remedial labor and em-
ployment statutes, urgently requires legislative reform.”).
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derutilized resources.10 Gig-economy companies, such as Uber, Airbnb, and
thredUP, connect non-owners interested in accessing these resources—here,
cars, spare bedrooms, and old clothes respectively—with owners willing to
allow access for a small fee. The explosion of such companies has produced
a growing number of gig-workers who do not seem to fit into either of the
binary worker categories—though far from traditional employees, they also
bear little resemblance to independent, small-business-operating contrac-
tors.11 Thus, the need for employment classification reform becomes ever
more pressing.
This note argues that members of the gig-economy are properly classi-
fied as employees rather than contractors under the current legal standard.
However, it further contends that because of outdated factors and wide-
spread confusion regarding the complexity of various standards, reform to
the employment classification system is necessary. Reforming the test will
ensure that gig-economy workers, a growing portion of the workforce, will
fall more clearly into the employee category and gain the necessary benefits
and protections that come with such a classification. Part I outlines the em-
ployment classification system and its origins. Part II details how the ram-
pant culture of employee misclassification and the rise of the gig-economy
each contribute to the increasing number of workers classified as indepen-
dent contractors—and suggests this is problematic in a society that predi-
cates worker protections on employment status. Part III focuses on the
common law control test, which determines worker classification under sev-
eral federal and state labor and employment statutes. Using Uber drivers as a
model for workers in the gig-economy, it suggests that gig-workers are prop-
erly classified as employees under the common law test. Part IV suggests
possible improvements to the employment classification system that will
help clarify the law and secure protections for workers in the gig-economy.
I. BACKGROUND ON WORKER CLASSIFICATION
Almost since its inception, America has classified its workers into legal
categories.12 Even before the Industrial Revolution, the “master-servant” re-
lationship required clear delineation, as certain rights and responsibilities
were tied to this arrangement.13 For example, according to Blackstone’s
Commentaries, the law surrounding master-servant relationships dictated the
rate and method of payment and grounds for termination.14 Additionally, the
10. Joseph Shuford, Note, Hotel, Motel, Holiday Inn and Peer-to-Peer Rentals: the
Sharing Economy, North Carolina, and the Constitution, 16 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 301, 302
(2015).
11. Id. at 302-03.
12. See Carlson, supra note 2, at 302 (“Even the pre-industrial world had some need for
classification.”).
13. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *410-20.
14. See id.
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question of a master’s vicarious liability turned on whether his worker was
classified as a “servant.”15
Today, America’s binary classification system sorts workers into two
categories: employee or independent contractor.16 A worker’s status as an
employee or independent contractor has far-reaching effects on that worker’s
legal rights and responsibilities.17 Yet, despite the importance of the em-
ployee/contractor distinction and the fact that the distinction has been around
for so long, these classifications remain ill-defined by both legislatures and
courts.  Though this definitional problem appears in many contexts and
across statutes, this note will focus on the question of who qualifies as an
employee for the purpose of providing workers’ benefits and protections, as
these are at the heart of the legal battles taking place in courts today.
A. What is an Employee? What is an Independent Contractor?
Why does it Matter?
The term “employee” appears in a wide range of statutes and common-
law rules, and “may very well have a different meaning in each of these
contexts.”18 Many labor and employment statutes that provide benefits and
protections contingent upon employment status provide little guidance for
determining who qualifies as an employee. The Fair Labor Standards Act
(“FLSA”), for example, provides a circular definition of an employee as
“any individual employed by an employer,”19 while the National Labor Re-
lations Act (“NLRA”) defines it as “any person acting as an agent of an
employer.”20 According to the U.S. General Accounting Office (“GAO”),
“[w]orkers who must follow instructions on when, where, and how to work
are more likely to be viewed as employees.”21 The clearest example of the
traditional employee is someone who works for one employer, onsite, on a
fixed schedule, for a consistent period of time, and is compensated in
wages.22
The term “independent contractor” is just as poorly defined, and many
labor and employment statutes do not attempt to define independent contrac-
15. See id.
16. Seth D. Harris & Alan B. Krueger, A Proposal for Modernizing Labor Laws for
Twenty-First-Century Work: The “Independent Worker 7 (The Hamilton Project, Discussion
Paper No. 2015-10, 2015).
17. For an extensive list of labor and employment laws that apply to employees and not
independent contractors, see Appendix.
18. Brian A. Langille & Guy Davidov, Beyond Employees and Independent Contrac-
tors: A View from Canada, 21 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 7, 18 (1999).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (2015).
20. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2015).
21. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE TESTIMONY, GAO/T-GGD-94-194 TAX AD-
MINISTRATION: IMPROVING INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR COMPLIANCE WITH TAX LAWS 2
(1994).
22. See the common law test for an employee, Part I.B.
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tor at all. Instead, these statutes simply assign the term to people who do not
fit the definition of an employee, making it a catch-all category for the his-
torically small group of workers whose jobs fall outside the traditional em-
ployment model.  Though lacking a formal definition, there are certain
characteristics that many independent contractors have shared throughout
history. In feudal society, independent contractors could serve numerous cli-
ents simultaneously, and unlike servants, they were not devoted to a single
master.23  Likewise, modern independent contractors today enjoy more flexi-
bility than do traditional employees. Just as feudal independent contractors
were, practically speaking, their own masters, modern independent contrac-
tors are their own bosses; they can choose where they work, when they
work, for whom they work, and for what rate of pay they work.24
However, while this increased flexibility can be extremely valuable, it
comes at a cost. An emblematic independent contractor is one who works
without supervision performing a task that falls outside the employers’ usual
course of business.25 As such, contractors are generally viewed as self-em-
ployed workers providing a particular service—or are sometimes even con-
sidered individual small businesses.26 This means that contractors are
responsible for several legal and financial obligations that traditional em-
ployees need not consider. For example, independent contractors must pay
their own payroll taxes directly to the government, including income taxes
and their share of social security.27 They must provide for their own benefits
packages, including disability and health insurance.28 Independent contrac-
tors must also take responsibility to ensure their own job security and sus-
tainable income.29
However, the most substantial cost to being an independent contractor is
that they are carved out of most labor and employment statutes. Among the
benefits that these statutes bestow on employees (but not contractors) are
antidiscrimination, wage and hour, and family and medical leave protec-
23. See Carlson, supra note 2, at 303 (“Not[ ] all workers were ‘servants’ . . . [T]he term
‘independent contractor’ appears to have been associated in early times with the idea of an
‘independent calling’ or a distinct occupation, and early sources suggest that the person in
question was not devoted to a single master but was free to serve several clients simultane-
ously or in seriatim.”).
24. Noah Lang, Manifesto for a Modern Worker Class: The On-Demand Contractor,
LINKEDIN: PULSE (June 18, 2015), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/manifesto-modern-worker-
class-on-demand-contractor-noah-lang.
25. See Brian Muse, Lawsuits Challenge Classification of Uber Drivers as Independent
Contractors, JDSUPRA BUSINESS ADVISOR (June 3, 2015), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/
lawsuits-challenge-classification-of-96447/.
26. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE TESTIMONY, supra note 21, at 2 n.1 (“In fact,
independent contractors are small businesses.”).
27. Id. at 3.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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tions,30 unemployment insurance and workers’ compensation programs,31
and the right to unionize.32 With all of these legal rights riding on a worker’s
employment status, it is difficult to understate the importance of a clear and
consistent way to distinguish between employees and contractors that accu-
rately reflects the modern economy.
B. The Common Law Control Test and the Need for Reform
  The common law control test was the first legal standard to emerge to
determine which workers fell into which category.33  It consists of ten fac-
tors: control, supervision, integration, skill level, continuing relationship,
tools and location, method of payment, intent, employment by more than
one company, and type of business.34 No single factor is dispositive. Courts
evaluate each of the ten factors with an eye towards determining which party
generally has control over the work process: if the employer controls, the
worker is deemed an employee, and if the worker controls, he is deemed an
independent contractor.35
The common law control test is rooted in traditional agency law. Courts
developed the test primarily to resolve liability disputes between workers
30. Anna Deknatel & Lauren Hoff-Downing, ABC on the Books and in the Courts: An
Analysis of Recent Independent Contractor and Misclassification Statutes, 18 U. PA. J.L. &
SOC. CHANGE 53, 54-55 (2015).
31. Id.
32. See Jenna Amato Moran, Note, Independent Contractor or Employee?: Misclassifi-
cation of Workers and Its Effect on the State, 28 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 105, 122 (2010)
(“[E]mployees are guaranteed their right to bargain collectively . . . Workers in a contingent
arrangement, such as independent contractors, do not enjoy these same benefits.”).
33. Worker classification is relevant under many statutes, and various tests are used to
determine classification under such statutes. This note focuses on the traditional common law
control test, which applies to the many federal statutes today and is the test on which all others
are based. The IRS uses a derivation of the common law control test for the purpose of deter-
mining employment tax obligations under the Federal income tax law. It also employs the test
to determine who is eligible for social security benefits and unemployment insurance under the
Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) and the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA)
respectively. Charles J. Muhl, What is an Employee? The Answer Depends on the Federal
Law, MONTHLY LAB. REV. 5 (Jan. 2002). Furthermore, the common law test is used for em-
ployment determinations made under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), the Immigra-
tion Reform and Control Act (IRCA), and the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA). Id. The Supreme Court has also held it should be used for any federal statutes
that do not explicitly define the term employee. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503
U.S. 318, 322-24 (1992). Finally, several state courts use variations of the common law control
test to determine employment status under state labor and employment statutes. For example,
in O’Connor v. Uber Techs. Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015), an upcoming class
action case against Uber alleging misclassification of its drivers, the Northern District of Cali-
fornia will apply the Borello test. This test applies eight of the ten common law factors and
mentions the remaining two as additional factors for consideration. See O’Connor, 82 F. Supp.
3d at 1139.
34. Muhl, supra note 33, at 7.
35. Id. at 5.
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and employers.36  Considering its origin, the test’s focus on control makes
perfect sense; to determine whether an employer was liable for the torts of a
worker, we would want to know how much control the employer asserted
over the working conditions of the employee. Masters tightly controlling and
supervising their servants were liable to third parties for their workers’ mis-
takes.  (After all, they were in charge of the working environment, owned
the tools used, directed the tasks at hand, and ultimately had the final say.)
In contrast, independent contractors—free from such supervision—remained
liable for their own actions.
The common law control test that courts use today is remarkably un-
changed from its original formulation, despite the fact that employment rela-
tionships have evolved dramatically since the rule’s inception.  First, the
Industrial Revolution brought about the decline of feudal society and the
master-servant model.37 Later, in response to the Great Depression, the New
Deal emerged—further altering employment and labor laws to address new
concerns facing the modern-day workforce. The New Deal-era labor statutes
used the employee/independent contractor distinction—and, implicitly, the
common law control test—to define the scope of their coverage. Congress
has continued to rely on this distinction in labor statutes throughout the
twentieth century. The National Labor Relations Act, Fair Labor Standards
Act, Employee Retirement Security Act (“ERISA”), and American’s with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”) are just a few statutes that cover workers classified
as employees, but not those classified as contractors.38
As a result, today many worker benefits and protections hinge on em-
ployment status. And although the common law control test emerged before
worker protection laws even existed, the test serves to categorize workers
under many of these laws. Though some of these statutes have articulated
new tests to determine employment status, each of these tests closely reflects
the original common law test, sharing several of the same factors and con-
siderations.39  While the common law control test and the employee/contrac-
36. See Carlson, supra note 2, at 314-15 (“Initially . . . worker status was truly impor-
tant only in the event of the occasional accident for which the employer might be held liable.
Indeed, the first significant and authoritative statement addressing the problem of worker sta-
tus, contained in the Restatement (First) of Agency of 1933, distinguished ‘servants’ from
‘independent contractors’ for purposes of respondeat superior liability.”).
37. Id. at 303 (“Little of Blackstone’s simple portrait of master-servant relations sur-
vived into the industrial revolution, especially in America . . . The Industrial Revolution, with
its accompanying explosion of new occupations and ways of organizing work, shattered this
simplicity.”).
38. See Jost, supra note 9, at 313 n.3. The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA), Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), Employee Retire-
ment Security Act (ERISA), and Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) are just a few statutes
that cover workers classified as employees, but not those classified as contractors.
39. The most common legal tests used to determine whether a worker is an employee or
independent contractor include the common law right to control test, the economic realities
test, the Internal Revenue Service twenty-factor test, and the ABC Test.
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tor distinction may have been adequate to define the scope of labor laws in
the twentieth century, they cannot be so easily adapted to twenty-first cen-
tury employment relationships. The reasons for this are explored in the next
section.
II. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM
A relic of past battles, some of which are no longer relevant, America’s
employment classification system is in great need of reform. The following
section outlines two problems with our current classification system—a cul-
ture of misclassification and the rise of workers falling outside of the tradi-
tional binary scheme. Both lead to an increasing proportion of workers
classified as independent contractors under federal and state statutes.
A. Rampant Misclassification
  Misclassification, or the improper classification of workers as independent
contractors instead of employees, greatly contributes to the growing number
of people identified as contractors today, both in the United States and
abroad. In 2000, a study commissioned by the U.S. Department of Labor
(“DOL”) concluded that “nearly a third of all employers misclassified some
employees as contractors.”40 In 2005, the DOL estimated that over ten per-
cent of private sector workers were misclassified.41 While worker misclas-
sification has been especially prevalent in the construction, trucking, and
housekeeping industries, it is present in some form in nearly all sectors.42
Two related factors drive this phenomenon: ambiguity in the law and em-
ployers’ economic motivations.
1. Confusion and Ambiguity in the Law
  The confusing, ambiguous legal tests for employment classification lead
employers to misclassify workers both intentionally and unintentionally.43
One source of confusion and ambiguity in the current legal framework is the
existence of multiple legal standards for determining whether a worker is an
40. Caroline Fredrickson, Is Your Uber Driver an Independent Contractor or an Em-




42. James Surowiecki, Gigs with Benefits, THE NEW YORKER (July 6, 2015), http://
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/07/06/gigs-with-benefits.
43. STAFF OF J. COMM ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG., Present Law and Background Re-
lating to Worker Classification for Federal Tax Purposes 8 (May 2, 2007) (“A major source of
the confusion regarding classification of a worker as an employee or an independent contractor
is that present law requires an examination of a variety of factors that often do not result in a
clear answer. . . [I]n close cases the law creates a significant gray area that leads to complexity,
with the potential for inadvertent errors and abuse.”), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/x-26-
07.pdf.
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employee or independent contractor.  Among the standards currently in use
are the traditional common law control test,44 the economic realities test,45
the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) twenty-factor test,46 and the ABC
Test.47 Courts, government agencies, and state legislatures use these differ-
ent legal tests to classify workers depending on the agency, jurisdiction, or
statute at issue. The IRS, for example, employs a different test than the
DOL,48 and the DOL itself employs numerous tests based on which federal
law it is enforcing.49
On top of the sheer number of balancing-tests is the fact that each test
consists of multiple factors, ranging from as few as three50 to as many as
twenty,51 that must be considered to determine employee status. The varying
and often excessive number of factors raises additional ambiguity and confu-
sion for courts, juries, employers, and workers alike. This problem has not
gone unnoticed by Congress. In 2007, a report by the Joint Committee on
44. See Karen R. Harned, et al., Creating A Workable Legal Standard for Defining an
Independent Contractor, 4 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 93, 100 (2010) (“The ‘right to
control’ looks at the control the employer has over the employee but not over an independent
contractor, focusing on the employer’s right to direct the means of production. The common
law ‘right to control’ test is used by courts to determine employee status in various types of
cases, including employment discrimination and benefits cases, tax cases, and tort (wrongful
act) liability cases. This approach to classification stems from the agency law definition of
employee, and relies on a thorough investigation of the facts of each case. This test generally
gives employers more latitude to classify workers as independent contractors than do other
legal approaches.”).
45. See Moran, supra note 32, at 116-17 (The economic realities test “examines whether
the worker is not only under the control of the employer . . . but is also economically depen-
dent on the employer. The analysis is [commonly] based on six factors: (1) the extent of the
individual’s investment in the equipment and facilities; (2) the individual’s opportunity for
profit or loss; (3) the degree of control exercised by others over the individual’s work; (4) the
importance of the services to the alleged employer’s business (i.e., whether the service per-
formed is an integral part of the business); (5) the permanency of the relationship between the
work and the employer; and, (6) the skill required of the individual in performing the work.”).
46. See STAFF OF J. COMM ON TAXATION, supra note 43 (“In 1987, based on an exami-
nation of cases and rulings, the [IRS] developed a list of 20 factors that may be examined in
determining whether an employer-employee relationship exists. The degree of importance of
each factor varies depending on the occupation and the factual context in which the services
are performed; factors other than the listed 20 factors may also be relevant.”).
47. See Deknatel & Hoff-Downing, supra note 30, at 65 (The ABC Test is “a simplified
version of the common law ‘right to control’ factors with a presumption of employment sur-
mountable only by satisfying a three-prong assessment . . . The three factors as laid out in the
Massachusetts and other state statutes are: (A) that ‘the individual is free from direction and
control,’ applicable both ‘under his contract for the performance of service and in fact,’ (B)
that ‘the service is performed outside the usual course of business of the employer,’ and (C)
that the ‘individual is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation,
profession, or business of the same nature as that involved in the service performed.’ ” (citing
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 148B(a)(1)-(3) (2016)).
48. See Moran, supra note 32, at 108.
49. Id. at 107-08.
50. ABC Test.
51. Traditional IRS Test.
Spring 2016] A New Take On an Old Problem 351
Taxation pointed to some of the predominant issues with multi-factor tests,
specifically in the employment classification context. The report stated:
Under the common-law test, some of the relevant factors may sup-
port employee status, while some may indicate independent contrac-
tor status, and there are no rules for the weight that any particular
factor is given. In addition, some of the relevant factors involve an
examination of objective facts, while others involve an examination
of subjective facts or an examination of a combination of objective
and subjective facts.52
Under such a system, reasonable people may differ as to the correct classifi-
cation of an individual when given a certain set of facts. For example, an
employer acting in good faith may reasonably classify his workers as con-
tractors, but an IRS agent or judge may reach the opposite conclusion by
weighing factors differently.53 Employers and workers therefore lack mean-
ingful notice, since they cannot predict the assessment of a judge or agency
in any meaningful way.54
Another problem with the multi-factor approach is that despite legisla-
tures’ attempts to update the factors to prevent misclassification,55 the con-
tinuous modernization of the economy makes many factors increasingly less
relevant and more manipulable. For example, given the increase in popular-
ity of telecommuting, or working remotely, the location of the work factor is
outdated and easily manipulated in favor of independent contractor status.56
The existence of multiple standards and numerous, outdated factors results
in an unpredictable, overly complex classification system that leaves a grow-
ing number of workers unprotected.
2. Employers’ Economic Motivations
  Employers’ economic considerations also lead to an increase in the num-
ber of workers misclassified as independent contractors, even when such a
relationship does not exist.57 Misclassification is often motivated by incen-
52. See STAFF OF J. COMM ON TAXATION, supra note 43, at 8.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., Deknatel & Hoff-Downing, supra note 30, at 58 (“Twenty-two states have
passed one or more statutes between 2004 and 2012 to alter their prior requirements for
designating independent contractors or to alter the enforcement structure or penalties used
against employers who fail to do so correctly.”).
56. See infra Parts III.F and III.G.
57. Employers in competitive industries have particularly strong economic incentives to
misclassify employees as contractors in order to obtain competitive advantages over their com-
petitors. This in turn challenges competitors to make similar moves to avoid an unfair playing
field both at home and abroad. See DEP’T OF LABOR, ADMINISTRATOR’S INTERPRETATION NO.
2015-1, APPLICATION OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT’S “SUFFER OR PERMIT” STANDARD
IN THE IDENTIFICATION OF EMPLOYEES WHO ARE MISCLASSIFIED AS INDEPENDENT CONTRAC-
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tives to minimize the cost of labor and limit employer liability.58 When em-
ployers classify employees as independent contractors, they avoid the costs
of payroll taxes, minimum wage, and overtime; the risks of employment
discrimination law; the need to bargain with unions; and the burden of pro-
viding unemployment insurance, workers’ compensation, or family and
medical leave.59 As a result of these savings, independent contractors are
estimated to cost twenty to thirty percent less per worker.60  To take advan-
tage of these potential cost savings, employers have used various tactics to
label workers as independent, for example by manipulating subtle semantic
distinctions, exploiting subcontracting structures, or registering workers as
independent business entities.61 They often get away with these tactics by
capitalizing on the ambiguity in the law discussed above.62
B. The Rise of the Gig-Worker
  The growing number of workers classified as independent contractors re-
flects more than rampant misclassification. The rise of the non-traditional
workforce has led to an increase in workers falling outside the traditional
employee model—while far from the emblematic nine-to-five employee,
gig-workers are not independent business owners either. Though govern-
ment studies are limited and reflect older data, the most recent GAO study
estimated that the non-traditional workforce, broadly defined, comprised
35.3 percent of all employed workers in 2006, and 40.4 percent in 2010.63
This is a significant increase from a 1999 DOL study, which found that
alternative work arrangements comprised only 9.3 percent of America’s
workforce.64 Since they are not employees under the statutory definitions in
most labor statutes, the majority of these workers are labeled as independent
contractors.
TORS at 1 (2015) [hereinafter DOL INTERPRETATION]; see also Jost, supra note 9, at 315; see
also Deknatel & Hoff-Downing, supra note 30, at 55 (explaining that businesses following the
rules must compete with those “taking unfair advantages to their bottom line by skirting
taxes.”).
58. See Moran, supra note 32, at 106.
59. See Carlson, supra note 2, at 337; see also Deknatel & Hoff-Downing, supra note
30, at 53.
60. See Steven Greenhouse, U.S. Cracks Down on “Contractors” as a Tax Dodge, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 18, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/18/business/18workers.html?page
wanted=all&_r=0 (quoting Ohio Attorney General Richard Cordray’s estimate).
61. Deknatel & Hoff-Downing, supra note 30, at 53.
62. See supra Part II.A.1.
63. The GAO defines “non-traditional workforce” as “workers [who] do not have stan-
dard work arrangements—permanent jobs with a traditional employer-employee relationship.”
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-168R, CONTINGENT WORKFORCE: SIZE, CHAR-
ACTERISTICS, EARNINGS, AND BENEFITS 4 (2015), http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/669766.pdf.
64. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FUTUREWORK: TRENDS AND CHALLENGES FOR WORK IN THE
21ST CENTURy 9 (1999), http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=10
66&context=key_workplace.
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As a growing part of the workforce holds non-traditional forms of em-
ployment, fewer and fewer people are protected by the labor and employ-
ment statutes that have protected workers for decades.  Congress enacted
laws like the FLSA under the assumption that most of the workforce would
be traditional employees; independent contractor status was not intended to
apply to a significant portion of the population. Classifying all gig-economy
workers as contractors will result in an increasing number of workers left
unprotected by labor and employment laws.
C. The Effects of a Growing Number of Independent Contractors
  The rise of independent contractors presents several complications for a
society that predicates worker protections on employee status. Independent
contractors are not entitled to minimum wage, overtime compensation, un-
employment insurance, disability insurance, health insurance, workers’ com-
pensation, and other benefits that help secure their health, safety, and
wellbeing.65 They have no social safety net to fall back on.66  To make mat-
ters worse, many workers classified as contractors fail to purchase these
forms of insurance individually, as they do not identify as self-employed.67
The growing number of gig-economy workers, and consequently uninsured
workers, creates systemic problems for the country at large.
Another significant harm of expanding the independent contractor cate-
gory is decreased government tax revenue.68 When employees are misclassi-
fied as independent contractors, unemployment insurance funds, payroll
taxes, and workers’ compensation funds go unpaid.69 A series of government
studies reveal the sizeable economic impact of misclassification. For exam-
65. See Fredrickson, supra note 40 (“The societal consequences [of misclassification]
are significant, allowing the circumvention of protections that guarantee workers a decent
wage, maternity leave, protections from harassment and discrimination — the kinds of things
President Obama has characterized as ‘basic needs,’ not bonuses: ‘They should be part of our
bottom line as a society.’ ”); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE TESTIMONY, supra note 21,
at 3 (“Independent contractors themselves must provide for any benefit packages, such as life
and health insurance, they choose to obtain.”).
66. Hamza Shaban, Senator Warner Calls For New Policy To Address On Demand
Economy, BUZZFEED (June 4, 2015), http://www.buzzfeed.com/hamzashaban/on-demand-
economy-collides-with-presidential-politics-in-war#.ge4m0xy5Y (In the words of Senator
Mark Warner, uninsured gig-workers “may be doing extraordinarily well — until they’re not,
and then there is nothing to catch them until they end up, candidly, back on the taxpayer’s
dime.”).
67. Jacquelyn Smith, Self-Employment Rates Are Down Since the Recession, but May
be on the Rise Again Soon, FORBES (Feb. 6, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jacquelyn-
smith/2014/02/06/self-employment-has-declined-since-the-recession-but-it-may-be-on-the-
rise-again-soon/#498983fa7e56 (stating that only 6.6% of reported jobs were self-employed).
68. See DOL INTERPRETATION, supra note 57.
69. See Deknatel & Hoff-Downing, supra note 30, at 55; see also A.B.A, Employee
Misclassification Can Lead to Big Penalties for Employers, A.B.A. E-NEWSLETTER (July
2011), https://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/youraba/201107article05.html
(“A 2009 study by the treasury inspector general estimated that misclassification costs the
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ple, the New York Department of Labor’s Unemployment Insurance Divi-
sion audits from 2002 through 2005 revealed an average of over 175 million
dollars per year in underreported taxes to the state’s unemployment insur-
ance fund.70 In addition, the Colorado Department of Labor and Employ-
ment estimated a 167 million dollar loss in income tax revenues annually
due to misclassification.71 The lack of tax revenue has two causes. First,
employers avoid paying unemployment taxes and a portion of social security
taxes by classifying workers as independent contractors.72 Second, workers
classified as independent contractors often do not recognize themselves as
self-employed and thus fail to pay the full amount of their federal tax contri-
butions themselves.73 It is also more difficult for independent contractors to
successfully pay their taxes, as tax collection is more effective at the organi-
zation level rather than at the individual level.74
III. COURTS APPLYING THE COMMON LAW CONTROL TEST SHOULD
CLASSIFY GIG-WORKERS AS EMPLOYEES
The many shortcomings of the antiquated worker classification system
used in America today demonstrate a serious need for legislative reform.
Meanwhile, gig-economy workers have already turned to the courts in
search of employee status, and judges must work within the current legal
United States $54 billion in underpayment of employment taxes and $15 billion in unpaid
FICA and unemployment taxes.”) (emphasis in original).
70. Linda H. Donahue, James Ryan Lamare & Fred B. Kotler, The Cost of Worker
Misclassification in New York State, CORNELL UNIVERSITY, SCHOOL OF INDUSTRIAL AND LA-
BOR RELATIONS (Feb. 2007), http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
1009&context=reports.
71. COLO. DEP’T OF LABOR AND EMP’T, 09-1310, Misclassification of Employees as
Independent Contractors, ANN. COMPLIANCE REP. 11 (June 2, 2011), https://www.carpenters
.org/Libraries/Documents_PDFs/Colorado_Annual_Compliance_Report_6-11.sflb.ashx.
72. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE TESTIMONY, supra note 21, at 2-3 (“For work-
ers classified as employees, the employer must withhold and deposit income and social secur-
ity taxes from employee wages. The employer is also required to pay unemployment taxes and
a share of social security taxes . . . In contrast, independent contractors—not the employer—
have to take responsibility for their taxes, benefits, and income and job security.”).
73. Id. at 1-4 (“Independent contractors tend to have lower tax compliance than employ-
ees . . . IRS studies since the 1970s have consistently documented a difference in tax compli-
ance between employees and self-employed workers such as independent contractors.
Employees historically reported almost all of their wage income. Conversely, IRS has found
that independent contractors, in the mid-1970s, reported 74 percent of their business in-
come. .An IRS study of independent contractors who should have been classified as employees
found that they only reported 62 percent of their income for 1984.’ IRS’ most recent compli-
ance results. . .continued to show a large difference in compliance rates . . .”).
74. Id. at 8-9 (“IRS and tax researchers generally agree that these compliance differ-
ences can be explained by ‘opportunity.’ Being subjected to income tax withholding (unlike
independent contractors), employees have little opportunity to underreport income and escape
detection. Withholding provides employees with a gradual and systematic way to pay their
taxes. It also facilitates IRS tax collection by consolidating and filtering periodic tax payments
from millions of employees through their employers.”).
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framework to resolve these disputes.75 Using Uber drivers as a model for
workers in the gig-economy, this section will analyze how courts should
think about the employment status of these workers under each factor of the
common law control test.76 Unless and until legal reform occurs, courts
should classify Uber drivers and similarly situated workers in the gig-econ-
omy as employees under this test.
A. Control & Supervision
  The first factor of the common law control test is known as “the right to
control.”77 Typically, if a worker is found to assert control over the details of
his work, he is labeled as an independent contractor under this factor. Con-
versely, if the employer asserts control over the details of the work, then the
worker is classified as an employee.  A second, related factor of the common
law test is supervision, which classifies workers as employees when they are
directly supervised by their employers, and which classifies workers as inde-
pendent contractors when they are not directly supervised. These two factors
in particular are so intertwined that they will be analyzed together.
In response to numerous cases brought against Uber regarding the clas-
sification of its workers,78 Uber claims it does not exercise control over or
supervise its drivers and thus drivers should be classified as independent
contractors under these two factors.79 Uber drivers do not work onsite and
are not directly overseen by managers. Uber’s recruitment website even
boasts the tagline: “NO OFFICE, NO BOSS”80 and emphasizes its drivers’
75. Uber is currently facing employment classification litigation in California, Florida
and Massachusetts.
76. Again, although a multitude of statutes make classification of workers relevant and
deploy numerous standards, this paper focuses on the traditional common law control test,
which applies to many federal statutes today and is the test on which all others are based. See
infra note 33.
77. The control factor is included in all iterations of the common law control test as well
as the economic realties test and the ABC test.
78. Kristen V. Brown, Uber is Facing a Staggering Number of Lawsuits, FUSION (Jan.
25, 2016), http://fusion.net/story/257423/everyone-is-suing-uber/ (reporting that in 2015, 50
lawsuits were filed against Uber in U.S. federal courts.); see, e.g., O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d
1133; Berwick v. Uber Techs. Inc., Case No. 11-46739 EK, Cal. Labor Comm’n (June 3,
2015).
79. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, O’Connor v. Uber Techs. Inc., No. 13-
03826-EMC, 2014 WL 10889983 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2015) (According to Uber’s Motion for
Summary Judgment in the O’Connor case, the company has “no control over how [workers]
conduc[t] their independent businesses, including when and whether to log into the Uber App,
what hours to work, where to seek passengers, whether to use other lead generation services
simultaneously with the Uber App or their own marketing to locate customers, what car to
drive, or what clothing to wear.”).
80. UBER, https://get.uber.com/cl/drtv/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2016).
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freedom to set their own schedules.81 As long as drivers give at least one ride
every 180 days (if on the uberX platform) or every 30 days (if on the Uber-
Black platform), they can freely activate Uber’s application and begin driv-
ing customers.82 Additionally, Uber claims that drivers can decide whether
or not to accept “leads”—or passengers in need of a ride—as they wish and
without penalty.83 Given the contractor-like flexibility that Uber allows its
drivers, Uber argues that the control and supervision factors weigh in favor
of independent contractor status.84 However, Uber’s claim that it possesses
minimal control over its drivers and allows them to operate without supervi-
sion is highly questionable, for several reasons.
First, Uber exercises control over its drivers by imposing standards of
conduct. For example, the Onboarding Script, written in the language of
command, instructs drivers to “make sure [they] are dressed professionally;”
“make sure the radio is off or on soft jazz or NPR;” and “make sure to open
the door for [the] client.”85 While Uber claims these are merely suggestions,
the company’s ability to fire drivers for violating these “suggestions” indi-
cates otherwise.86
Furthermore, plaintiffs in the O’Conner class action suit contest Uber’s
claim that drivers can reject leads as they see fit. As evidence, they point to
the Uber Driver Handbook—a book of instructions given to drivers upon
hire, which expressly states:  “We expect on-duty drivers to accept all [ride]
requests.”87  In addition, the plaintiffs cite to specific emails in which Uber
managers suggest a low acceptance rate is grounds for driver termination.88
It seems drivers are free to reject rides, but in doing so they may be risking
their jobs.
Second, Uber asserts control and supervision by monitoring workers
through Uber’s rating systems. Many workers today work offsite, as technol-
ogy enables a growing number of employees to telecommute.89 However, as
81. Id. (“[Y]ou’ve got freedom and flexibility to drive whenever you have time. Set
your own schedule, so you can be there for all of life’s most important moments . . . Uber
gives you the freedom to get behind the wheel when it makes sense for you.”).
82. O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1149.
83. Id.
84. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, O’Connor v. Uber Techs. Inc., No. 13-
03826-EMC, 2014 WL 10889983 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2015) (“Plaintiffs admitted at deposition
that Defendant has never required them to log in to the Uber App at any particular time or for
any amount of time, has never set their work schedules, has never threatened to deactivate
their accounts for failure to adhere to a particular schedule, and has never required them to
accept any particular trip request received via the Uber App.”).




89. See Latest Telecommuting Statistics, GLOBALWORKPLACEANALYTICS.COM (Jan.
2016), http://globalworkplaceanalytics.com/telecommuting-statistics (“50% of the US work-
force holds a job that is compatible with at least partial telework and approximately 20-25% of
Spring 2016] A New Take On an Old Problem 357
technology progresses and the economy modernizes, there are new forms of
control and supervision that a court or jury must recognize. Though Uber
and other gig-economy companies do not directly supervise their employees
in the traditional sense, the rise of customer rating systems provides a mod-
ern alternative for monitoring workers. Companies can now police their
workforce indirectly through ratings systems based on customer input. When
Judge Edward Chen denied Uber’s motion for summary judgment in the
O’Conner case, he explained how Uber’s rating system is far more than just
a customer feedback tool—it is a monitoring system that provides Uber with
an “arguably tremendous amount of control over the ‘manner and means’ of
its drivers’ performance.”90 Quoting from Foucault’s Discipline and Punish,
Judge Chen explained that this “state of conscious and permanent visibility
assures the automatic functioning of power.”91 While it is certainly true that
Uber does not conduct performance inspections or have managers ride along
with drivers, the company still monitors the quality of its drivers during each
and every ride through customer ratings.92 Moreover, many official Uber
documents explicitly state that the company monitors customer ratings and
feedback and considers such information sufficient grounds for driver disci-
pline or even termination.93  This is certainly a pervasive means of asserting
control and supervision over Uber’s workforce.
Lastly, Uber has the right to terminate its employees at will, and courts
often find an employer’s ability to fire at will to be strong evidence of the
right to control.94 Though Uber claims it can only terminate drivers “with
notice or upon the other party’s material breach” of employment contracts,95
the actual text of these contracts allows Uber to fire drivers for any reason, at
the workforce teleworks at some frequency . . . Fortune 1000 companies around the globe are
entirely revamping their space around the fact that employees are already mobile. Studies
repeatedly show they are not at their desk 50-60% of the time . . . Regular work-at-home,
among the non-self-employed population, has grown by 103% since 2005.”); see also Kenneth
Rapoza, One In Five Americans Work From Home, Numbers Seen Rising Over 60%, FORBES
(Feb. 18, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2013/02/18/one-in-five-americans-
work-from-home-numbers-seen-rising-over-60 (“[S]ome 30 million [Americans] work from a
home office at least once a week. And that number is expected to increase by 63% in the next
five years . . .”).
90. O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1152.
91. Id.
92. Josh Dzieza, The Rating Game, THE VERGE (Oct. 28, 2015), http://www.theverge
.com/2015/10/28/9625968/rating-system-on-demand-economy-uber-olive-garden (“The rating
systems used by these companies have turned customers into unwitting and sometimes unwit-
tingly ruthless middle managers. . . . They represent a new level of monitoring, far more
pervasive than any watchful boss.”).
93. O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1151.
94. See Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, 327 P.3d 165, 171 (Cal. 2014); see also
S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc, v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 769 P.2d 399, 404 (Cal. 1989) (explain-
ing that the right to terminate at will, without cause, is “[s]trong evidence in support of an
employment relationship.”).
95. O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1148.
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any time.96 The company regularly terminates accounts when drivers fail to
meet Uber’s standards, and several sources demonstrate that drivers must
maintain a rating of 4.5 out of five stars to avoid risk of termination.97
By imposing standards of conduct, monitoring workers through ratings
systems, and maintaining the ability to fire employees at will, it is clear that
Uber asserts extensive control and supervision over its employees. Thus,
these two factors weigh in favor of Uber drivers gaining employee status.
B. Integration
  Another factor considered by the common law control test is integration,
which asks whether the service provided by the worker is an integral part of
the employer’s business, or in other words, whether the business is conceiva-
ble without them.98 When a worker engages in the regular work of his em-
ployer, courts will more likely classify him as an employee.99  In contrast, an
independent contractor’s work is less likely to be an integral part of the
employer’s business, as contractors are often hired to provide some special-
ized, peripheral skill that the employer’s business is not adequately equipped
to perform. For example, a plumber offers a special service outside the em-
ployer’s usual course of business; he is therefore not integral to the em-
ployer’s business and is correctly classified as an independent contractor.
To rebut the seemingly obvious conclusion that Uber is in the business
of transportation—and that its drivers are integral to its business—the com-
pany characterizes itself as a software technology company.100 Uber distin-
guishes its drivers’ work—transportation—from its primary business “of
developing mobile lead generation and payment processing software.”101
The company owns no vehicles and claims it employs no drivers; rather, it
develops and licenses proprietary technology.102 Thus, by claiming it is a
96. Id. ( “Uber will have the right, at all times and at Uber’s sole discretion, to reclaim,
prohibit, suspend, limit or otherwise restrict the Transportation Company and/or the Driver
from accessing or using the Driver App . . . ”).
97. Id. at 1143 (referencing Docket No. 223–29 at 2 (“We will be deactivating Uber
accounts regularly of drivers who are in the bottom 5% of all Uber drivers and not performing
up to the highest standards. . . . We believe that the removal of underperforming drivers will
lead to more opportunities for our best drivers.”); Docket No. 238–2 (spreadsheet listing termi-
nated driver accounts and reasons for termination); Docket No. 238–3 (email from “Uber SF
Community Manager” instructing fellow Uber employer to “[g]et rid of this guy. We need to
make some serious cuts of guys below 4.5”); Docket No. 238–5 (email terminating un-
derperforming Uber driver because business was “slower than normal and we have too many
drivers. . . . [so] we have to look for accounts to deactivate”)).
98. Muhl, supra note 33, at 8-9.
99. See generally, Carlson, supra note 2, at 348-49.
100. See Muse, supra note 25.
101. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, O’Connor v. Uber Techs. Inc., No. 13-
03826-EMC, 2014 WL 10889983 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2015).
102. Other members of the sharing-economy make similar claims; they are simply tech-
nology platforms allowing excess resources to be efficiently put to use. See infra note 104.
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broker of transportation services, not a provider of such services, Uber ar-
gues that the integration factor swings in its favor.103
However, precedent reveals that attempts to evade the integration factor
using semantic distinctions do not stand up in court.104  As we saw in Le-
high, Judge Hand found that coal-miners were integral, given that the coal-
mining business was inconceivable without them.105 Similarly, courts have
held that cake decorators are “obviously integral” to the business of selling
cakes,106 and that “[i]t does not take much of a record to demonstrate that
pickling the pickles is a necessary and integral part of the pickle busi-
ness.”107 Following suit, Judge Chen was skeptical of Uber’s argument in his
memorandum, denying Uber’s motion for summary judgment in the current
California class action. Judge Chen explained:
Uber’s self-definition as a mere “technology company” focuses ex-
clusively on the mechanics of its platform (i.e., the use of internet
enabled smartphones and software applications) rather than on the
substance of what Uber actually does (i.e., enable customers to book
and receive rides). This is an unduly narrow frame. Uber engineered
a software method to connect drivers with passengers, but this is
merely one instrumentality used in the context of its larger business.
Uber does not simply sell software; it sells rides.108
Judge Chen is well justified in seeing through Uber’s arguments. Prior to the
O’Connor litigation, Uber regularly promoted itself as a provider of trans-
portation services, referring to itself as an “On–Demand Car Service” and
“Everyone’s Private Driver.” Previously, Uber’s CEO wrote on its official
blog: “We are Uber and we’re rolling out a transportation system in a city
near you,”109 and another company document states “Uber provides the best
transportation service in San Francisco.”110 Such documents are no longer in
use by the company, for obvious reasons, but they nonetheless demonstrate
103. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, O’Connor v. Uber Techs. Inc., No. 13-
03826-EMC, 2014 WL 10889983 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2015).
104. See Deknatel & Hoff-Downing, supra note 30, at 100 (“[D]espite some employers’
attempts to re-characterize the nature of their businesses, courts have been unwilling to draw
such stringent lines in defining a business’s purpose and have rejected an employer’s attempt
to limit and distinguish its business from the services that many of its workers perform.”); see
also Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1078 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“Lyft tepidly asserts . . .
[it] merely furnish[es] a platform that allows drivers and riders to connect . . . But that is
obviously wrong.”).
105. Lehigh Valley Coal, 218 F. at 552 (“By him alone is carried on the company’s only
business; [the miner] is their ‘hand,’ if any one is.”).
106. Dole v. Snell, 875 F.2d 802, 811 (10th Cir. 1989).
107. Sec’y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1537-38 (7th Cir. 1987).
108. O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1141.
109. Id. at 1137.
110. Id.
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that before framing its current litigation arguments, Uber understood itself to
be in the business of transportation.
Finally, Uber drivers’ role is integral to Uber’s business because the
company would not be able to function without them. Uber does not earn
revenue by selling its software products; it earns revenue by taking a cut of
its drivers’ fares.111 As Judge Chen pointedly observed, “Uber only makes
money if its drivers actually transport passengers.”112 Uber drivers therefore
provide an indispensable and integral service to Uber—a service that is the
very business of the company. As such, the integration factor weighs in
favor of employee status.
C. Skill Level
  Another factor of the common law control test is the worker’s degree of
skill. A worker whose job requires the use of a simple or commonly held
skill set is more likely classified as an employee, whereas a worker with a
highly specialized skill set is more likely classified as an independent con-
tractor.113 Indeed, one could imagine that a less skilled worker would require
greater supervision, while a highly or uniquely skilled worker would require
less—since such workers are usually hired to provide a service that is
outside the scope of an employer’s typical business. An employer would
have a difficult time supervising or asserting control over a uniquely skilled
worker, as the employer would likely be unfamiliar with the worker’s craft.
In its motion for summary judgment in the O’Conner case, Uber cited
Sahinovic v. Consol. Delivery & Logistics, a case in which delivery drivers
challenged their independent contractor status.114 As the court explained,
“the primary skills [of the plaintiff workers] involve[d] driving and deliv-
ery.”115 In Sahinovic, the court concluded that the skill factor “is neutral or
slightly favors a finding that Plaintiffs are [independent contractors].”116
However, Sahinovic provides only one example and goes against an over-
whelming majority of court precedent. More commonly, courts consider
drivers to be unskilled workers and thus employees.117  In fact, in a recent
decision against Uber’s biggest competitor, Lyft, Inc., Judge Chhabria ex-
111. Id. at 1144.
112. Id. (emphasis in original).
113. Muhl, supra note 33, at 8.
114. Sahinovic v. Consol. Delivery & Logistics, No. C 02-4966 SBA, 2004 WL 5833528
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2004).
115. Id. at 7.
116. Id.
117. See, e.g., Alexander v. FedEx, 765 F.3d 981, 995 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that the
skill factor favored employee status because FedEx drivers “need no experience to get the job
in the first place and [the] only required skill is the ability to drive.”); see also, JKH Enters. v.
Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 563, 580 (Ct. App. 2006) (“[T]he functions per-
formed by the drivers, pick-up and delivery of papers or packages and driving in between, did
not require a high degree of skill.”); see also Fedex Home Delivery, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 55, 19
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plained, “driving for Lyft requires no special skill—something we expect
independent contractors to have.”118 In light of this precedent and the simple
fact that driving does not seem to require a high degree of skill, this factor
weighs in favor of employee status.
D. Continuing Relationship
  Another factor of the common law control test is the duration of the busi-
ness relationship between employer and worker. The idea behind this factor
is that independent contractors are frequently involved in short-term engage-
ments, whereas employment relationships tend to be long term.
Uber argues that its workers can walk away from their relationship with
the company at any time—as Uber contracts contain mutual termination pro-
visions and parties are only compensated on a per trip basis.119 Recent stud-
ies confirm that drivers do indeed walk away—quite often in fact. Uber’s
data shows that eleven percent of its new drivers stop driving within a
month, and about half are gone within a year.120 Based on these statistics,
this factor might seem to favor contractor status, however recent precedent
suggests otherwise.
In a factually similar 2014 case on the employment status of FedEx
delivery drivers, the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) found that
despite the ability to terminate their relationship with FedEx at any time,
drivers “have a permanent working arrangement with the company under
which they may continue as long as their performance is satisfactory.”121
Thus, the NLRB found that this factor favored employment status. Similarly,
Uber drivers enter into a permanent relationship that may continue as long as
both parties find it beneficial. They do not enter separate agreements per task
or individual job like a typical independent contractor would. There is no
end date in the contract they sign. Therefore, in light of the recent precedent,
this factor favors employee status.
E. Tools
  The common law control test also considers which party provides the tools
and materials needed to perform the work. In general, if a worker uses tools
provided by his employer, he is classified as an employee. On the other
hand, if a worker provides his own tools and instrumentalities and is respon-
(2014) (“Drivers are not required to have any special training or skills . . . The skill factor thus
weighs in favor of employee status.”).
118. Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1080.
119. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, O’Connor v. Uber Techs. Inc., No. 13-
03826-EMC, 2014 WL 10889983 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2015).
120. Ellen Huet, Uber’s Ever-Renewing Workforce: One-Fourth Of Its Current U.S.
Drivers Joined Last Month, FORBES (Jan. 22, 2015, 4:14 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
ellenhuet/2015/01/22/uber-study-workforce/#1923e4641244.
121. FedEx Home Delivery, 361 N.L.R.B. at 19.
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sible for their maintenance, he is more likely an independent contractor.
Uber drivers must provide and maintain their own vehicles, and are respon-
sible for obtaining insurance, license and registration, and often a GPS de-
vice. Accordingly, this factor seems to favor independent contractor status.
However, relevant precedent shows that this factor either slightly favors
independent contractor status, or is entirely neutral. First, Uber asserts con-
trol over the vehicles driven by requiring they meet a series of specifications.
To ensure compliance, each Uber vehicle must undergo an inspection by the
company.122 In the FedEx case, the NLRB explained, “the significance of
vehicle ownership is undercut considerably . . . by the fact that [a company]
plays a primary role in dictating vehicle specifications.”123
Secondly, Uber recently started a program that assists in the car
purchasing process.124 Those buying a car to drive for Uber receive special
discounts and financing options, and Uber partners with specific lenders to
cover those with low credit.125 The program automatically deducts car pay-
ments from drivers’ weekly earnings, so they pay less upfront.126 Courts
have found that such “involv[ment] in the purchasing process” where an
employer “provid[es] funds and recommend[s] vendors” for vehicles cuts
against the independent ownership of the vehicles.127
Third, Uber’s claim that it does not provide drivers with any tools is
simply false. If they do not own a smartphone, Uber leases its drivers
iPhones to run the Uber app. When ruling on this factor, courts have consid-
ered it relevant that drivers obtain other equipment (besides their car) from
an employer.128 And as the court stated in O’Conner, a smart phone running
the Uber app is not just “other equipment,” but a “the critical tool of the
business.”129
Lastly, courts have repeatedly and explicitly stated that car ownership is
not dispositive when determining employment status. For example, the
NLRB found that FedEx delivery drivers, despite being required to own
their own vehicle, were in fact employees of FedEx.130 Numerous other
cases in California have similarly found that drivers are employees despite
the fact that they own their own vehicles.131 Courts sometimes defend these
122. Though specifications vary by city, cars typically must be a 2000 model or newer,
be covered by insurance, have four doors and minimum cosmetic damage, and undergo inspec-
tion. See UBER, https://www.uber.com/driver-jobs (last visited Apr. 3, 2016).
123. FedEx Home Delivery, 361 N.L.R.B. at 19.
124. See UBER, https://get.uber.com/cl/financing (last visited Apr. 15, 2016).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Estrada v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc., 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 327, 334 (2007).
128. Alexander, 765 F.3d at 995.
129. O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1136.
130. FedEx Home Delivery, 361 N.L.R.B. at 19.
131. See, e.g., Alexander, 765 F.3d 981; S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc, v. Dep’t of Indus.
Relations, 769 P.2d 399, 409 (Cal. 1989); Estrada, 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 331; Air Couriers
Spring 2016] A New Take On an Old Problem 363
decisions by explaining that these vehicles are typically used for purposes
outside of work.132
Considering the amount of control Uber has over the vehicles driven,
the company’s involvement in the purchasing process, and the fact that Uber
provides some instrumentalities to its drivers, it is unlikely courts would put
much weight on the fact that Uber drivers must use their own cars.
F. Location
  Courts also consider physical location as a factor under the common law
control test.133 Typically, if a worker works onsite he is more likely classi-
fied as an employee, whereas if a worker primarily works outside his em-
ployer’s place of business, he is more likely an independent contractor. The
location factor is grounded in the fact that, at least traditionally, an employer
enjoyed increased control and supervision over those working onsite.
Because Uber drivers do not work onsite, this factor favors independent
contractor status. However, the physical location factor is absent or under-
emphasized in many recent judicial inquiries using the common law control
test.134 This is likely because the factor is growing outdated in the modern
economy, and is no longer a good indicator of employee status.
With the rise of new and better communication technologies, telecom-
muting has become increasingly common. According to Forbes (citing sta-
tistics from a Telework Research Network study), “some 30 million
[Americans] work from a home office at least once a week” and “that num-
ber is expected to increase by 63 percent in the next five years.”135 As
telecommuting becomes more frequent, the justifications for tying employee
status to a worker’s physical location become weaker and weaker. In a world
where some thirty million Americans work from home, it is questionable
whether location should be used to determine which workers are protected
by labor and employment laws. For this reason, many statutory tests for
distinguishing contractors and employees (such as the economic realities test
and most versions of the ABC test) have already eliminated location as a
factor. The common law test should do the same.
Intern. v. Employment Dev. Dep’t., 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 37, 47 (2007); JKH Enters., 48 Cal. Rptr.
3d at 569; Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc. v. Superior Court, 269 Cal. Rptr. 647, 654 (1990).
132. See Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1080; see also Gonzalez v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals
Bd., 46 Cal. App. 4th 1584 (1996) (noting that a car used by a worker “frequently serves also
as a family all-purpose vehicle”).
133. Location and tools are usually considered one factor at common law, but they re-
quire separate consideration. See Muhl, supra note 33.
134. See, e.g., Alexander, 765 F.3d 981; see also Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1080.
135. Rapoza, supra note 89.
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G. Method of Payment
  The method of payment factor is “nearly as old as the control test itself,”
as early wage legislation based coverage on the distinction between hourly
wages and other forms of payment, like salary.136 Under this factor, workers
paid on a per-task basis are likely independent contractors, while workers
paid on an hourly wage or salary are likely employees.137 Since Uber pays its
drivers on a per-trip basis, this factor seems to favor independent contractor
status.
However, the fact that Uber asserts control in determining the method of
payment to its drivers skews this factor in favor of employee status. First,
Uber sets the fare amount unilaterally, without any input from its drivers.
Uber also solely determines the fee it takes from the total fare, and has in-
creased its cut in some cities from twenty percent to as high as thirty percent
without negotiation or input from the drivers.138 In a traditional contractor-
employer relationship, payment per task may have been common, but it was
also usually the result of a negotiation between the parties involved—who
possessed relatively equal bargaining power. Today, Uber drivers have no
control over what rates their customers are charged or even what percentage
of the fare they receive from their trips. In the FedEx case, the NLRB found
that given the fact that “FedEx establishes and controls drivers’ rates of
compensation, which are generally nonnegotiable . . . the method of payment
factor weighs in favor of employee status.”139 In line with this reasoning, the
method of payment factor actually favors employee status for Uber drivers.
H. Intent
  Courts also consider the intent of both parties when assessing the employ-
ment relationship under the common law test. They look to the terms of the
employment agreement (if one exists) for evidence of the parties’ intent. If
there is a signed contract stating the parties’ intent to enter into an indepen-
dent contractor or employee relationship, it is considered significant evi-
dence of that status.140 Uber’s contracts with its drivers explicitly state that
both parties intend for drivers to be considered independent contractors141
136. See Carlson, supra note 2 at 346.
137. See e.g., Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751-52
(1989); see also Locations, Inc. v. Hawaii Dep’t. of Labor, 900 P.2d 784, 789 (Haw. 1995);
Sherard v. Smith, 778 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Tex. App. 1989); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 220(2)(g) cmt. j (1958); Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296, 299 (Factor twelve sets
forth that “[p]ayment by the hour, week, or month generally points to an employer-employee
relationship . . . ”).
138. Huet, supra note 120.
139. See e.g., FedEx Home Delivery, 361 N.L.R.B. at 19 (Finding that since “FedEx
establishes and controls drivers’ rates of compensation, which are generally nonnegotiable. . .
the method of payment factor weighs in favor of employee status.”).
140. See Arnold v. Mut. of Omaha Ins., 202 Cal. App. 4th 580, 584-85 (2011).
141. O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1136.
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and that the Uber contract “is not an employment agreement or employment
relationship.”142
Although this factor weighs in favor of independent contractor status,
recent court cases have found this factor non-dispositive.143 This is likely
because employers can easily manipulate contract language to include a
statement of intent in order to create the appearance of an independent con-
tractor relationship on paper to avoid employment laws.144 This is especially
troublesome in light of the fact that there may be unequal bargaining power
between workers and employers. For this reason, courts usually look beyond
contractual wording and examine the circumstances to determine the actual
nature of the relationship.145 The parties’ beliefs regarding legal status are
“not controlling if as a matter of law a different relationship exists.”146 Rela-
tive bargaining power is also considered. In the FedEx case, for example, the
NLRB recognized the inability of FedEx drivers to negotiate over the terms
of their contract—particularly the terms classifying them as independent
contractors.147 Thus, the NLRB found the intent factor “inconclusive.”148
Because intent is so easily manipulated by employers, both the eco-
nomic realities test and the ABC test no longer include this factor. The com-
mon law control test should be similarly reformed. Nevertheless, given the
lack of bargaining power the typical Uber driver possesses, the NLRB’s rul-
ing in FedEx should control—which would mean that the intent factor
should be deemed inconclusive.
I. Employment by More than One Company
  An additional factor of the common law control test asks whether the
worker provides services to more than one employer. Traditional employees
usually work for one employer at a time, while independent contractors
often perform services for multiple employers. This factor is predominately
used to determine whether a worker is in business for himself.
Uber claims that its drivers “may use the Uber App as much or as little
as they like, while continuing to service their regular clients or passengers
142. Id. (referencing Addendum at 7; Service Agreement at 9).
143. See e.g., Alexander, 765 F.3d at 997 (“[P]arties own perception of their relationship
is not dispositive.”); see also JKH Enters., 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 580.
144. See Deknatel & Hoff-Downing, supra note 30, at 98 (“[E]mployers attempting to
evade independent contractor laws may use the independent contractor agreement as evidence
that the worker is an independent contractor, even if the arrangement in practice functions
differently than the employer’s carefully selected language suggests.”).
145. See, e.g., W. Ports Transp., Inc. v. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t., 41 P.3d 510, 516 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2002) (“Contractual language, such as a provision describing drivers as independent con-
tractors, is not dispositive; instead, the court considers all the facts related to the work
situation.”).
146. Grant v. Woods, 71 Cal. App. 3d 647, 654 (Ct. App. 1977).
147. See FedEx Home Delivery, 361 N.L.R.B. at 19.
148. Id.
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acquired from any other source — including from competing services like
Sidecar and Lyft and, in some instances, through street hails and taxi dis-
patch services.”149 This is perhaps the most convincing case Uber makes in
favor of independent contractor status for its drivers, as many drivers do
indeed work simultaneously for Lyft, Sidecar, and other companies that di-
rectly compete with Uber.
However, while drivers are allowed to work for Uber competitors, Uber
does place restrictions on a driver who chooses to do so. For example, the
Uber driver Handbook forbids drivers from answering customer inquiries
about booking future rides outside of the platform.150 Even “passive client
solicitation” such as handing out business cards or branded equipment for
another company, is considered a major issue which Uber “takes very
seriously.”151
Regardless, the goal of this factor is to determine whether a worker is in
business for himself. As the NLRB found with FedEx delivery drivers, Uber
drivers seem to have effectively no control over any important business deci-
sions. Like FedEx, Uber “has total command over its business strategy . . .
recruitment, and the prices charged to customers” and Uber “unilaterally
drafts, promulgates, and changes the terms of its Agreements with driv-
ers.”152 Under this arrangement, Uber drivers cannot effectively operate as
independent business owners. They are not free to advertise their services,
set their own prices, or negotiate with clients. For these reasons, courts could
easily find, as the NLRB did in FedEx, that drivers “do not have the inde-
pendence, nor are they allowed the initiative and decision-making authority,
normally associated with an independent contractor.” Thus, they are better
classified as employees, regardless of their ability to drive for multiple
platforms.
J. Type of Business
  The type of business factor asks whether the worker is engaged in a busi-
ness or occupation distinct from the employer. This factor is typically ap-
plied either to determine whether the worker works for another employer
(covered by employment by more than one company) or whether the worker
is engaged in the same type of business as the employer (covered by integra-
tion). Thus, a separate analysis is redundant to that in Parts III.B and III.I.
149. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, O’Connor v. Uber Techs. Inc., No. 13-
03826-EMC, 2014 WL 10889983 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2015).
150. O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1142 (citing Handbook at 7) (explaining that such
solicitation is categorized as a “Zero Tolerance” occurrence that “may result in immediate
suspension from the Uber network.”).
151. Id.
152. FedEx Home Delivery, 361 N.L.R.B. at 19.
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IV. A GUIDE TO LEGISLATIVE REFORM
As the analysis in Part III demonstrates, almost all of the common law
control test factors weigh in favor of classifying Uber drivers (and similarly
situated gig-economy workers) as employees. But despite this conclusion,
the problem remains that several factors of the control test are outdated and
easily manipulable. Such factors, combined with the rampant culture of
worker misclassification and the rise of the gig-economy, contribute to a
growing number of workers classified as independent contractors.
This section recommends three ways to improve our worker classifica-
tion system and increase the number of protected workers. First, courts
should adopt a new test that includes a presumption of employment; second,
the number of factors in the new test should be limited; and third, the new
test should override all the various other tests and apply uniformly to all
federal statutes that concern employee benefits and protections. The ABC
test, currently used by nearly two-thirds of the states,153 incorporates a pre-
sumption of employment, uses only three factors, and has the potential for
uniform application across statutes. Therefore, it can serve as a model for the
federal government.
A. Presumption of Employment
  In many states today—including nearly every state employing the ABC
test154—the default presumption is that a worker is an employee rather than
an independent contractor. This presumption should be incorporated into the
common law control test for several reasons.
First, a presumption of employee status would, in aggregate, increase
the number of workers covered by labor and employment statutes. As dis-
cussed in Part II, there are several practical and policy-oriented reasons to
support this outcome, such as maximizing the number of workers receiving
employee benefits, protections, and insurance, and increasing government
tax revenue.
Second, a presumption favoring employee status could curtail misclas-
sification. Forcing employers to carry the burden of proving independent
contractor status would make it more difficult for them to improperly clas-
sify workers as contractors in order to increase profits. If used uniformly
across statutes, the presumption also clarifies the law and puts employers on
notice of how to appropriately comply.
153. Howard Sokol & Edward C. Frischling, New York’s Fair Play Act Changes Rules of
the Road for the Commercial Goods Transportation Industry, HOLLAND & KNIGHT ALERT
(Jan. 31, 2014), https://www.hklaw.com/publications/New-Yorks-Fair-Play-Act-Changes-
Rules-of-the-Road-for-the-Commercial-Goods-Transportation-Industry-01-31-2014/.
154. See Deknatel & Hoff-Downing, supra note 30, at 71 (“An initial presumption of
employee status has been more implemented than any other form or feature of the ABC test:
only two states, Kansas and Maine, chose to omit an explicit or implicit . . . presumption of
employee status . . . ”).
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Third, a presumption towards employee status places the burden of
proof on the party with more resources. This matters because, if and when a
worker is able to recognize his own misclassification, going to court is often
the only way to establish employee status and eligibility for legal protec-
tions.155 But for many misclassified employees, the expense and time re-
quired for litigation effectively blocks off that avenue for redress.
Conversely, when workers are misclassified as employees (a much rarer oc-
currence, given the economic benefits of contractor status), an employer typ-
ically has better knowledge of the law and greater resources available to
seek redress than an employee. In sum, a presumption in favor of the party
with less knowledge and resources (the individual worker) levels the playing
field and allows meritorious cases to be effectively litigated.
B. Limited Number of Factors
  Employment relationships exist in infinite varieties, so no bright-line rule
will apply neatly in all circumstances. This likely explains why legislatures
have almost exclusively used multi-factor tests to determine worker status,
despite the many flaws associated with such tests.156
The new test should be limited to three or four core factors, since tests
that include more than four factors tend to increase confusion, over-mechan-
ical application, and subjectivity.157 Reducing the number of factors makes
the test clearer and more concise, thus providing proper notice and curtailing
misclassification. The reformed legal standard should also eliminate the out-
dated and manipulable factors such as method of payment, location, and
intent. Proper classification will result when factors are limited to those that
are relevant and reflective of the modern economy.
C. A Single Test
  Unionization rights, employee benefits, and wage and hour laws each fall
under different federal statutes, meaning different legal tests are used to de-
termine whether a worker is an employee for the purpose of each of these
protections.158 The theory behind the multitude of standards is that each ap-
plicable statute serves distinct purposes, so employment is defined differ-
ently for each. Perhaps this statutory purpose argument makes sense when
discussing employment in very different contexts—such as employment sta-
155. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-859T, EMPLOYEE MISCLASSIFI-
CATION: IMPROVED OUTREACH COULD HELP ENSURE PROPER WORKER CLASSIFICATION 7
(2007), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07859t.pdf.
156. See supra Part II.A.1.
157. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringe-
ment, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1581, 1646 (Dec. 2006) (further explaining that “multifactor tests of ten
or even eight factors appear to ask too much of the judge’s ability simultaneously to weigh
competing concerns and may simply result in the stampeding of less significant factors”).
158. See Appendix for details.
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tus for tax purposes versus employment status for intellectual property pro-
tection—but the variation in legal standards amongst statutes that provide
worker protections and benefits is both confusing and unnecessary.
The nuances in statutory purpose among labor and employment statutes
are not significant enough to justify the current piecemeal approach.
Whether the primary purpose of the statute is “to aid the unprotected, unor-
ganized and lowest paid of the nation’s working population,”159 or “to pre-
vent injury to. . . employees,”160 or “to promote the stability and economic
security of [working] families,”161 most labor and employment laws are
united by one underlying goal—the protection of workers. By focusing on
this common goal, one comprehensive standard could exist for categorizing
employees for the purpose of providing workers’ rights of all kinds. Elimi-
nating multiple standards will decrease confusion, manipulation, and
misclassification.
D. A Lesson from the States: the ABC Test
  The ABC test, currently used by nearly two-thirds of the states,162 provides
a model for the federal government. The test is a simplified version of the
common law control test, and has come to dominate employment classifica-
tion reform across states.163 According to Deknatel & Hoff-Downing’s as-
sessment, “[t]he ABC test, coupled with a presumption of employee status
. . . has been the clearly favored test of state legislatures.”164
First, the ABC test includes a presumption of employment and thus af-
fords broad enough coverage to counteract the forces leading to the over-
classification of independent contractors.165 Second, the ABC test provides a
model for a succinct federal test, limited to the following three factors:
1. whether the worker is free from control or direction in the per-
formance of the work;
2. whether the work is done outside the usual course of the firm’s
business; and
159. Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707 n. 18 (1945) (citing legislative
debates on the purpose of the Fair Labor Standards Act).
160. 29 CFR § 1910.147(a)(3)(i) (2016).
161. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (1993).
162. Sokol & Frischling, supra note 153.
163. See Deknatel & Hoff-Downing, supra note 30, at 66 (“In the eight years from 2004
to 2012, sixteen states. . .have transformed the legal requirements to be an independent con-
tractor.  All of these states except two have implemented ABC tests or related formulations.”).
164. Id. at 67.
165. See Harned et al., supra note 44, at 102 (explaining that the ABC test’s presumption
“mak[es] it more difficult for unscrupulous employers to misclassify employees as indepen-
dent contractors to avoid legal obligations.”).
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3. whether the worker is customarily engaged in an independent
trade, occupation, profession, or business.166
The ABC test eliminates the most manipulable factors, such as intent, loca-
tion, and method of payment.
Third, the ABC test has the potential for uniform application across stat-
utes and can operate as the single standard for defining an employee for the
purpose of providing workers benefits and protections. As Deknatel & Hoff-
Downing suggest, the ABC test is most effective “when applied uniformly to
all workers and universally across all employment statutes.”167 Though the
ABC test is currently used primarily for purposes of state unemployment
insurance,168 many states apply it for other purposes as well. For example,
though Maine’s ABC test specifically applies to its workers’ compensation
and unemployment insurance statutes, “the state made its laws consistent
with preexisting standards in other statutes, creating a matching standard
across all laws.”169
Critics, such as Professor Buscaglia, claim that the ABC factors “are
only deceptively simple and in application are ‘neither clearer nor easier’
than the common law right to control factors that they typically replace.”170
However, by limiting the legal inquiry to three core factors and adding a
presumption in favor of employee status, the ABC Test offers a better alter-
native to the manipulable, increasingly outdated standards currently used
under federal labor and employment law—most notably, the control test.
V. CONCLUSION
This note details the outdated employment classification system, ad-
dressing problems such as ambiguity in the law and rampant misclassifica-
tion, and the new challenges posed by the growing number of gig-economy
workers. These combined forces contribute to a growing number of workers
classified as independent contractors—a problematic trajectory in a society
that predicates worker protections on employment status. Gig-economy
workers have turned to courts in the hopes of securing employee protections,
requiring judges to navigate and apply confusing and ambiguous multi-fac-
tor tests to resolve these disputes. Benefits and protections for this growing
number of workers cannot rise or fall on such outdated tests. Legislative
reform is essential, and the ABC Test offers the best alternative to the ma-
166. Id.
167. Deknatel & Hoff-Downing, supra note 30, at 53; see also id. at 73 (“The advantages
of a uniformly and universally applicable law are clear: if a worker is an independent contrac-
tor under one statute and an employee under another, compliance is expensive and complex for
employers, enforcement becomes inefficient, and workers are hampered from asserting their
eligibility for benefits and protections.”).
168. See Harned et al., supra note 44, at 102
169. Deknatel & Hoff-Downing, supra note 30, at 73.
170. Id. at 63.
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nipulable, increasingly outdated standards currently used under federal labor
and employment law (most notably, the common law control test). However,
until such legal reform occurs, courts should classify Uber drivers and simi-
larly situated gig-economy workers as employees under the common law
control test. A realistic, modern assessment of the current factors, recent
legal precedent, and the need for a safe and secure workforce demands it.
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VI. APPENDIX.
WORKER PROTECTIONS/BENEFITS PROVIDED TO EMPLOYEES
& NOT INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS
Protections Act(s) Test 
   
Minimum Wage Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) Economic Realities 
   
Overtime Pay Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) Economic Realities 
   
Youth Employment 
Standards 
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) Economic Realities 
   
Workplace Health and Safety Occupational Safety and Health Act 
(OSHA) 
Hybrid 
   
Retirement Plans, Benefits & 
Savings (including Social 
Security, Pensions, Life and 
Disability Insurance) 
Employee Retirement Security Act 
(ERISA) 
Common Law Control 
Test 
   
Health Plans & Benefits Employee Retirement Security Act 
(ERISA) 
Common Law Control 
Test 
   
Right to Unionize/Collective 
Bargaining 
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) Common Law Control 
Test 
   
Disability Resources American’s with Disabilities Act 
(ADA) 
Hybrid 




Title VII of the Civil Rights Act Economic Realities 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act  
Equal Pay Act (EPA) Economic Realities 
Rehabilitation Act  
Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act (ADEA) 
Hybrid 
Title I of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA) 
Hybrid 
Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) 
Hybrid 
   
Leave Benefits Family and Medical Leave Act 
(FMLA) 
Economic Realities 
   
Termination Protections Worker Adjustment and Retraining 
Notification Act (WARN) (early 
warning of impending layoffs or plant 
closings) 
Hybrid  
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Protections Act(s) Test 
   
Occupational Safety and Health Act 
(OSHA)(whistleblower protections) 
Hybrid 
Family Medical Leave Act (protection 
from termination due to medical leave) 
Economic Realities 
   
Veterans Benefits Uniformed Services Employment and 
Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) 
Hybrid 
   
Personal Privacy1 Employee Polygraph Protection Act 
(EPPA) (protects employees against 
polygraph testing) 
Economic Realities 
Consumer Credit Protection Act 
(CCPA) (protects employees against 
certain background checks) 
Hybrid 
American Disabilities Act (ADA) 
(protects employees against medical 
testing) 
Hybrid 
   
Workers Compensation Laws by State Multiple Variations 
   
State Unemployment 
Insurance 
Laws by State Variations of ABC 
Test and Common 
Law Control Test 
   
Federal Unemployment 
Insurance 




   




   
 Immigration Reform and Control Act 
(IRCA) 
Common Law 
Control Test 
